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PRECEDENTIAL 
  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3864 
___________ 
 
TARIK RACHAK, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
  ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
  Respondent 
          ____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A055-045-704) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
          ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2013 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
 
(Filed: August 21, 2013) 
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Anser Ahmad, Esq. 
Advanced Immigration Law Group 
114 Walnut Street, Suite 4 
Harrisburg, PA 17101-0000 
 Counsel for Petitioner Tarik Rachak 
 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
 
Margaret A. O’Donnell, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
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Christina B. Parascandola, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 Counsel for Respondent Attorney General 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Tarik Rachak petitions for review of a Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order deeming him ineligible 
for cancellation of removal and affirming the denial of a 
continuance.  We will dismiss the petition in part and deny it 
in part. 
 
I. 
 
 Rachak, who is a citizen of Morocco, was admitted to 
the United States as a lawful permanent resident in August of 
2002.  In 2006, he was arrested and charged with possession 
of marijuana under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(31).  
Rachak was placed on probation with supervision under 
Pennsylvania’s “Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition” 
program, Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 217, but did not 
comply with the conditions of the program.  Thereafter, the 
state court terminated Rachak’s participation in the program 
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and on February 16, 2011, Rachak pled guilty to the charge 
arising out of his 2006 marijuana possession arrest.  A.R. 
214-16. 
 
On July 20, 2011, Rachak pled guilty to charges of 
possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia under 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 780-113(a)(16) and (a)(32) in the York County 
Court of Common Pleas.  He was sentenced to two 
consecutive terms of twelve months of probation.  A.R. 186-
202.   
 
On September 29, 2011, the Department of Homeland 
Security charged Rachak with being removable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because he had been convicted of a 
controlled substance offense in July 2011.  Rachak then filed 
a Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition 
attacking his July 2011 conviction.  For a time, he 
successfully sought immigration continuances while he 
mounted his collateral attack, although the Government 
opposed some of these requests.   
 
At a hearing on May 24, 2012, Rachak’s attorney 
advised the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that his PCRA petition 
had been denied at the trial level “almost a month ago,” but 
was currently on appeal before the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court.  A.R. 119.
1
  The IJ issued an oral decision declining to 
grant any further continuances.  In addition, the IJ ordered 
Rachak removed and noted that his 2006 conduct rendered 
                                                 
1
 The Pennsylvania Superior Court subsequently affirmed the 
denial of his PCRA petition.  Pennsylvania v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).  Rachak’s petition for allowance of appeal 
was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Pennsylvania v. 
Rachak, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013). 
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him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a) because he had not accrued seven years of 
continuous residence in the United States.  A.R. 63-65.  The 
BIA affirmed, A.R. 3-5, and this timely petition for review 
followed. 
 
Rachak does not argue that the final order of removal 
itself was erroneously granted.  Instead, Rachak contends that 
the IJ and BIA wrongly determined that he was ineligible for 
cancellation of removal.  He also contends that his motion for 
an additional continuance should have been granted.  
 
II. 
 
We must first address the scope of our jurisdiction.  
Because Rachak is a criminal alien found removable pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), our review of the agency’s 
determination is limited to “constitutional claims or questions 
of law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D).  To fall under § 
1252(a)(2)(D)’s grant of jurisdiction, an issue must be either a 
“purely legal inquir[y]” or raise a “colorable” claim that a 
constitutional violation has occurred.  Roye v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 
A. 
 
The first issue Rachak raises in this appeal is whether 
he was statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal.  We 
hold that this issue involves a purely legal question 
concerning the operation of the “stop-time rule” of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d)(1)(B).  See Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56, 58 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“This appeal presents solely a 
question of law:  how to properly interpret 8 U.S.C. § 
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1229b(d)(1).”).  Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider 
whether Rachak was eligible for cancellation of removal.   
 
B. 
 
Next we examine whether we have jurisdiction to 
consider Rachak’s argument that the IJ “erred in denying a 
continuance in this case, and the BIA erred in affirming this 
decision.”  Rachak Br. 19.  We have never issued a 
precedential opinion deciding whether we have jurisdiction to 
review claims of this sort in the constrained context of 
criminal-alien petitions.  However, our case law provides 
helpful guideposts to resolve this issue.  
 
The denial of a motion for a continuance is 
discretionary.  Khan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 448 F.3d 226, 233 
(3d Cir. 2006).  We have held that discretionary decisions, as 
here, do “not raise a constitutional claim or question of law 
covered by [§ 1252(a)(2)(D)’s] judicial review provision.”  
Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 635 (3d Cir. 2006); 
see Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 188 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is clear that courts of appeals continue to 
have no jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual 
determinations presented in petitions for review.”).  
Specifically, we have recognized that “[d]espite the special 
treatment accorded constitutional claims and questions of 
law, § 1252(a)(2)(D) does not exempt . . . discretionary 
challenges from the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the 
[Immigration and Nationality Act].”  Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d 
at 634.  See generally Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 190 (“Recasting 
challenges to factual or discretionary determinations as due 
process or other constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to 
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give this Court jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D).”).2 
As a result, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction 
over Rachak’s challenge to the denial of his motion for a 
continuance.  We note that our holding today is in accord 
with those of our sister Courts of Appeals.  See, e.g., Waugh 
v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“[P]etitioner also argues the IJ and BIA erred in denying his 
request to continue the removal proceedings until his motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea was resolved in state court. . . .  
This challenge raises neither a constitutional nor a legal issue, 
so we are without jurisdiction to review it.”); Ogunfuye v. 
Holder, 610 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
petitioner’s “argument that the IJ abused its discretion by not 
granting her a continuance does not present a constitutional 
claim or issue of law that this court has jurisdiction to 
consider”); Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 
1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the denial of a 
continuance is discretionary and that the court lacks 
jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review such a denial).
3
      
                                                 
2
 Rachak does not contend that the denial of his motion for a 
continuance constituted a purely legal question and he did not 
directly argue that the denial raised a constitutional issue.  To the 
extent Rachak might have raised a due process claim flowing from 
the fact that the Pennsylvania appellate courts had not yet ruled on 
his PCRA challenge, it would have failed as we have held that the 
pendency of a collateral attack on a conviction does not negate the 
finality of the conviction for immigration purposes.  See Paredes v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008).  Of 
course, the agency is free to take the pendency of those matters 
into account when ruling on continuance motions.  
3 Rachak’s principal argument in support of our jurisdiction is 
based on Khan, where we noted that “we have jurisdiction to 
review an IJ’s denial of a continuance.”  448 F.3d at 233.  In 
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Accordingly, because we lack jurisdiction to review 
the agency’s denial of a continuance, we will dismiss this 
petition for review in part.   
 
III. 
 
We exercise de novo review of the agency’s 
interpretation of the stop-time provision of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d)(1)(B), subject to applicable principles of 
deference.  See Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 492 
F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007).  Since the BIA issued its own 
decision on the merits of this claim, we review only its 
decision.  Hanif v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 694 F.3d 479, 483 (3d 
Cir. 2012).   
 
The Attorney General may cancel removal of a 
permanent-resident alien who is otherwise inadmissible or 
deportable if, inter alia, the alien has “resided in the United 
States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in 
                                                                                                             
so doing, we held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which 
creates a jurisdictional bar for the review of decisions 
“specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the 
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,” did 
not apply to the denial of a continuance “[b]ecause the IJ’s 
authority to rule on a continuance motion is not specified 
under [8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1378] to be in the discretion of the 
Attorney General.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Here, as 
in Khan, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar review of the denial 
of a continuance.  Rather, the subsection applicable to this 
case is § 1252(a)(2)(C), which deprives us of jurisdiction if 
the final order of removal is due to the commission of certain 
criminal offenses.  Khan was not a criminal-alien case. 
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any status.”  8 U.S.C.          § 1229b(a)(2).  The statute 
terminates the accrual of the period of residence when the 
alien has “committed an offense” that renders him either 
inadmissible or removable.  Id. § 1229b(d)(1)(B).  Once the 
period of continuous residence is terminated, it is not 
restarted by subsequent events.  See Briseno-Flores, 492 F.3d 
at 230-31.  The parties agree that the 2006 conduct did not 
render Rachak removable, but it did plainly render him 
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) because it 
was “a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . 
relating to a controlled substance.”4   
 
Tacitly conceding his inadmissibility, Rachak contends 
that because “a waiver was available to Petitioner to waive 
the inadmissibility under this provision,” the “2006 offense 
did not stop the clock on the requisite seven (7) years of 
continuous residency in the U.S.”  Rachak Br. 15.  
Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) permits the Attorney General 
to waive the inadmissibility of an alien in certain 
circumstances relating “to a single offense of simple 
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”  But Rachak’s 
argument suffers from a fatal flaw:  he did not apply for this 
waiver before the agency, and indeed the record suggests that 
he has not invoked it before now.5  The mere existence of the 
waiver provision is immaterial to our analysis. 
 
We can discern no reason to disturb the BIA’s stop-
                                                 
4
 The inadmissibility carve-out of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
does not apply to controlled-substance convictions, but only to 
crimes involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
5
 We need not determine whether he would have actually been 
eligible. 
 10 
 
time decision as we agree that Rachak did not possess the 
required seven years of continuous residence for the purpose 
of applying for cancellation of removal.  As a result, we will 
deny the remainder of the petition for review.   
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition 
in part and deny it in part. 
